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ARTICLE

Dreaming in Chinese:
Accountable Development
BARBARA L. BEZDEK†

ABSTRACT
Economic life in the PRC today is marked by rapid privatization,
marketization, and urbanization. This triad of forces effects a
profound restructuring of China‟s urban spaces and is giving rise to
new forms of private, voluntary associations of citizens such as
neighborhood campaigns of resistance to urban redevelopment. Civil
society theory ascribes to such organizations outside of state control,
the potential to constrain government officials by enabling citizens to
express their collective interests more effectively, and to resist
government encroachment more powerfully than they otherwise
could. Because resort to China‟s courts has produced little protection
for citizens‟ formal legal rights in the event of forced demolition,
relocation, and compensation, urban homeowners have resorted to
extra-legal modes of resistance including protests, petitions, and
confrontations—some of them deadly. This article assesses the
potential to construct an „accountable development‟ frame as a set of
strategies to channel resentment and resistance into bargained-for
development agreements—situated between the market and the state,
neither anti-regimist nor stymied by the „turn from law.‟
I.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEMOLITION,
CHINA‘S POST-MAO PERIOD

AND

DISPLACEMENT

IN

China‘s rapacious urban redevelopment is colliding with Chinese
citizens‘ impassioned desire for accountability for the dislocation and
†

Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The title is
my grateful allusion to Deborah Fallows‘ insightful and unassuming little book, Dreaming in
Chinese: Mandarin Lessons in Life, Love and Language (2010). This gem, written by an
accomplished linguist, served as an inspirational guide to the author‘s study of Chinese while
a Fulbright Distinguished Lecturer in Shanghai in 2011.
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destitution caused by incessant land-grabs. China‘s urban renewal
generates tremendous inequalities of burden and benefit, and one
byproduct is explosive popular anger, directed at collusive deals
between local officials and a well-connected few. Perhaps of interest
to China‘s demolition refugees and their advocates are the
accountable-development practices that have arisen in the United
States to mitigate the negative impacts of development on targeted
neighborhoods.
Land is at the center of China‘s phenomenal economic growth.
State-led urban modernization drives the leaders of China‘s
government at all levels, eclipsing the industrial modernization of the
previous generation. 1 Ubiquitous urban redevelopment has been
imposed on tens of millions of citizens, often by means of forced and
violent evictions, wreaking wholesale community destruction,
inflicting further wounds through inadequate replacement housing
and paltry compensation. 2 The surprisingly full array of laws and
administrative procedures enacted to provide and protect property
rights has done little to alter the reality for China‘s city dwellers. 3
Socialist land masters continue to engineer endless development
projects, generating and appropriating the resultant land-value
increase.4 This in turn leads to massive and systematic demolition of
old homes5 and creates demand for new commodity housing,6 rapidly
1. See YOU-TIEN HSING, THE GREAT URBAN TRANSFORMATION: POLITICS OF LAND AND
PROPERTY IN CHINA 9–10 (2010); THOMAS J. CAMPANELLA, THE CONCRETE DRAGON:
CHINA‘S URBAN REVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WORLD 41–42 (2008)
(discussing China‘s experiment in urban modernization in Shenzhen).
2. Hsing reports that between 1990 and 2007, inner-city redevelopment and farmland
conversion displaced between 60 and 75 million people. YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at
2. China‘s urban transformation is occurring simultaneously with its rapid embrace of
market-oriented economic policy and its abrupt retreat from the socialist State‘s role in
providing for social welfare. Id. at 3.
3. The remarkable rate of China‘s urban expansion raises concerns about the urban and
rural social disruption it engenders, and the apparent inability of the central government to
maintain control over development. Erik Lichtenberg & Chengri Ding, Local Officials As
Land Developers: Urban Spatial Expansion In China, 66 J. URB. ECON. 57, 57 (2009).
4. See generally Susan Whiting, Values in Land: Fiscal Pressures, Land Disputes and
Justice Claims in Rural and Peri-urban China, 48 URB. STUD. 569 (2011) (exploring the
justice claims and disputes over land rights which are causing major social unrest in rural
China); Peter Ho, Who Owns China‟s Land? Policies, Property Rights, and Deliberate
Institutional Ambiguity, 2001 CHINA Q. 394 (exploring the difficulties and ambiguities of the
change in land ownership from the natural village to private ownership, especially in rural
China).
5. There are four key social problems resulting from rampant demolition: lack of rights
for evictees, lack of any organized system for resettlement, generally low compensation, and
difficulties in obtaining legal redress. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEMOLISHED: FORCED
EVICTIONS AND THE TENANTS RIGHTS MOVEMENT 24 (2004), http://www.hrw.org/
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remaking China‘s cities through the destruction of historic and Maoera communities, uprooting millions of citizens, and plunging many
into destitution, despair, and unwinnable disputes with the one-party
state that pins China‘s success to economic development.7
A.

The Rise of City-Building Fever

In city after city, local government asserts its power to
requisition land from its lawful occupants. 8 The relentless
redevelopment is accomplished through partnerships between local
governments, now-wealthy and well-connected businesses, and Party
elites. 9 The result: a renewed China built upon urban poverty and
shocking inequality.10 China is certainly not the only country in the
reports/2004/china0304/china0304.pdf. On the significance of China‘s land disputes in rural
and urban settings, see Eva Pils, Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in
China: A Case from Sichuan, 19 COLUM. J ASIAN L. 235 (2005).
6. Massive blocs of new housing go up in no time; but as commodity housing, not
replacement housing for those whose homes are demolished. Shenjing He & Fulong Wu,
Neighborhood Changes and Residential Differentiation in Shanghai, in CHINA‘S EMERGING
CITIES: THE MAKING OF NEW URBANISM 185, 191 (2007). While the 2007 Property Law
includes a requirement that ―compensation‖ be paid, it contains no standard for
compensation, nor rights to relocation or replacement housing. See Wuquan Fa (物权法)
[Real Right Law] art. 41 (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective
Oct. 1, 2007) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 262 (China). Moreover,
many of the housing units built in fact house no one: they stand unoccupied, unlit at night,
serving as an investment vehicle for their purchasers but doing nothing to alleviate the
chronic need for shelter in China‘s burgeoning cities. Shenjing He & Fulong Wu, supra, at
186.
7. See Pils, supra note 5, at 235–36.
8. See Eva Woo, Shanghai to Move 760,000 Residents from Inner-City Area, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 2004, at 8; China to Evict 170,000 Residents from Ancient City of
Xian, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 3, 2004; Xi‟an Plans to Better Protect Ancient Walled
Center, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 21236360; Beijing Denies
Reports on Large-Scale Evictions, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/11/content_313640.htm; Andrew Jacobs, In Beijing‟s Building
Frenzy, Even an „Immovable Cultural Relic‘ is Not Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at A6.
9. For instance:
Study Times, the official organ of the Communist Party's prestigious Central
Party School for training young officials . . . suggested that a major reason for
the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity was the alliance between
party officials and private businessmen that has grown since the party
abandoned doctrinaire socialism and made swift economic growth its main
mission.
Edward Cody, China Warns Gap Between Rich, Poor is Feeding Unrest, WASH. POST, Sept.
22, 2005, at A16.
10. In 2010, the Gini coefficient for China reportedly reached 0.47. Country‟s Wealth
Divide Past Warning Level, Analysts Say, CHINA DAILY, May 12, 2010, 2010 WLNR
9858001. ―The Gini coefficient, which measures income distribution on a scale of zero to
one indicates a moderate income gap if the number is between 0.3 and 0.4. A Gini index
between 0.4 and 0.5, however, signals a large income gap.‖ Fang Xuyan & Lea Yu, Gov‟t
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modern era to have bulldozed its way to become developed and
cosmopolitan. The U.S. urban renewal process during the 1950s and
1960s generated comparable inequalities and injustice.11
In China, all land is publicly owned, although recent
constitutional and statutory changes guarantee private rights to own
every other kind of property. The Chinese constitution provides that
land in urban areas is owned by the state, and land in rural areas
belongs to peasant collectives. 12 Development projects are built by
local governments,13 which stand to gain especially from high-profile
projects like Special Economic Zones, tech parks, clusters of highrise housing, and the huge New Cities.14 Local governments control
Refuses to Release Gini Coefficient, CAIXIN ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2012, 6:55 PM),
http://english.caixin.com/2012-01-18/100349814.html. ―When the Gini coefficient reaches
around 0.5, it means the inequality problem is extremely severe and needs immediate action
to bring it down.‖ Id. (quoting Chinese economist Zhou Tianyong). At .45, the U.S. Gini
coefficient is in the same range. See Max Fisher, Map: US Ranks Near Bottom on Income
Inequality, ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2011/09/map-us-ranks-near-bottom-on-income-inequality/245315/. The Chinese
central government has endeavored to narrow the wealth gap between its rich and poor
citizens. See, e.g., Government to Reduce Income Gap Through Reform: Officials, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, July 17, 2006, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/
MATERIAL/175032.htm (reporting on government efforts to provide civil servants with
larger salaries, subsides to work in ―remote and poverty-stricken areas,‖ increased fund
allocation for pensions, low-income subsidies, and veterans benefits).
11. For a comparative analysis, see Yan Zhang & Ke Fang, Is History Repeating Itself?
From Urban Renewal in the United States to Inner-City Redevelopment in China, 23 J.
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 286 (2004) (a comparative study of urban renewal in the United States
in the 1950s and 60s with inner-city redevelopment in China since the late 1980s).
12. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and
the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 355 (2008).
―Collective ownership used to mean the ownership held by the rural people‘s communes,
including the production brigades and production teams of the Mao era. Today the reference
is to ownership held by rural collective economic organizations through the contracted
responsibility system of each household.‖ Id. at 338 n.109.
13. There are several territory-based levels of governance throughout China, and today
urban governments have authority over a hierarchically organized set of jurisdictions that
includes urban districts, rural counties, and townships. YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at
94–95. This is a departure from the Mao era, when the vast majority of China‘s people lived
in rural areas. Id. Administrative authority was delegated from the central government to
each province, and within each of these were municipal governments authorized to
administer only the urban areas of prefectures and counties. Id. The central government
reversed this rural-oriented system in the 1980s as a necessary aspect of China‘s ‗opening
up‘ to modernization and integration with the global economy. Id. The resulting regional
integration of rural and urban territory has allowed provincial governments to convert rural
counties to urban status, creating municipalities out of vast rural expanses with new urban
centers. Id. at 94–95.
14. Deng Xiaoping‘s 1992 visit to the Shenzhen economic zone gave a green light to
construct development zones (kaifaqu), more than half of which were developed by rural
governments, converting farmland into industrial estates and rental housing, and some illegal
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land and profit directly from land rents, which have become one of
the most important sources of local revenue and capital
accumulation.15 Since the national land and housing reforms of the
1980s, infrastructure development, real estate, and housing have been
China‘s growth-generating sector, accounting for 25 to 50 percent of
local government income. 16 As the real estate market has proved
lucrative, land speculation has also become important to local
governments; the large fees from the transfer of land finance the
provision of local spending.17 Consequently, China‘s growing cities
occupy the center stage in the politics of accumulation and
distribution.
Local governments and their leaders both stand to benefit from
the enhanced amenities and reputational gains of urban renewal, 18
and local officials may enjoy kickbacks. 19 A survey of twelve
sales of land use rights to non-village developers. YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at 98–99.
When the small manufactures that anchored the kaifaqu proved insufficient to the task of
economic transformation, rural industrialism yielded to the ‗New Cities‘ (xincheng)
approach in the 2000s: mixed-use real estate projects offering new urban space for
residential, commercial, cultural, and administrative activities. Id. at 102–04. Consequently,
mega-urban projects have become a mark of ambitious urban government leaders who take
on the mantle of chief planners and developers. Id.
15. Governments continue to garner revenue from land, as a proprietor, collecting
receipts from direct land-leases and from renting government-built commercial and
industrial facilities. Id. at 47–48. Because this form of revenue is outside the state budgetary
system, it is fully retained at the local government level. Id. at 48. Land also generates
revenue from taxes and surcharges on land appreciation and transactions, but this income
stream is less stable because of tax evasion and avoidance. Id.
16. E.g., Last Year, Land Sales Revenue of Nearly 1.6 Trillion Yuan, CHINA DAILY, Feb.
3, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqcj/2010-02/03/content_9420885.htm.
17. The fiscal squeeze felt by local governments dates from the tax-sharing system
established in 1994: Taxes are collected at the local and intermediate levels, flowing toward
the central government. At the same time, there has been a marked decentralization of
responsibility to local governments to make the expenditures for basic public goods such as
education and welfare. See Susan H. Whiting, How Fiscal Pressures Drive Land Disputes
and Shape Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Rural and Peri-Urban China, 3–5 (April 16,
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/
ruleoflaw/papers/Whiting_Yale_workshop_041609.pdf.
18. Local officials, judged by economic measures such as the number of jobs they create
or buildings they develop, are thus ―trying the same formula: manufacturing and export
zones, research parks and self-styled Silicon Valleys.‖ Howard W. French, New Boomtowns
Change Path of China‟s Growth, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at A1. Ambitious plans, often
referred to as ―face projects,‖ are undertaken by local government officials who want to
invest in real estate because it stimulates GDP growth in a short time and enhances the
officials‘ performance record, which is considered important in appointments and
promotions. Shrawan Kumar Acharya, Inner City Revitalization in Beijing, ASIAN SCHOLAR,
3 http://www.asianscholarship.org/asf/ejourn/articles/acharya_s.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Olivia Chung, China‟s Land Income Leaking Away, ASIA TIMES, June 13,
2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JF13Cb01.html (noting that ―China
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thousand citizens in ten provinces in 2004 identified construction as
the most corrupt sector in China.20
B. Removal of the People from the People‟s Land
For China‘s citizens,21 urban renewal and city construction is a
nightmare. Chinese policy on resettlement is set out in national,
provincial and municipal laws, but the problem of inadequate
compensation is endemic, and often, cruel.22
Between 1990 and 2007, an estimated 60 to 75 million people
were displaced by urban and rural land conversion and inner-city
redevelopment.23 It is estimated that Beijing and Shanghai alone have
evicted some four million residents for urban redevelopment.24 The
frenzied process of land rights transfer, and its attendant
dispossession, sets off explosive incidents of opposition and
widespread social unrest. In 2004, there were 74,000 ―mass
incidents‖25 involving 3.7 million people, compared to 10,000 such
incidents involving 730,000 people in 1994. 26 Many of these
has for years been trying to make the sale and use of land more transparent;‖ and that land
sales are ―a major source of official corruption‖ in China; additionally citing to a National
Audit Office investigation saying ―Illegal transfers, corruption in land deals, and buying land
on lease from villagers for non-agricultural use instead of through public tender auction, is
rampant in major cities.‖).
20. Yongshun Cai, Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China: The Defense of
Homeowners‟ Rights, in GRASSROOTS POLITICAL REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 174,
177 & 373 n.13 (Elizabeth J. Perry & Merle Goldman eds., 2007).
21. The common people (lǎobǎixìng) are ‗the people‘ in the People‘s Republic of China,
the ordinary common folks, and, throughout Chinese history, the have-nots. What they do
not have has changed over the centuries, of course. In Imperial China, there were those with
the power to rule, and the lǎobǎixìng; in Mao‘s era, the key was political; in contemporary
China, the connotation is economic: ―the cab drivers, office workers, migrant workers, small
shopkeepers, beauticians, food sellers, the people on the street . . . all those who are trying to
make the staggering adjustments to survive.‖ DEBORAH FALLOWS, DREAMING IN CHINESE:
MANDARIN LESSONS IN LIFE, LOVE AND LANGUAGE 66 (2010).
22. Intensifying social unrest across China conveys a deepening sense that the legal
reforms of the past two decades have failed to provide adequate channels for resolving
conflicts between government and citizens. Pils, supra note 5, at 235.
23. YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at 2.
24. Qinglan Long, Reinterpreting Chinese Property Law, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55,
67 (2009).
25. Minxin Pei, China is Paying the Price of Rising Social Unrest, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2005, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/11/07/china-is-paying-price-of-risingsocial-unrest/7bz. Since 1999, the Ministry of Public Security and its think tanks have
adopted as the new standard phrase for protests ―mass group incidents.‖ Murray Scot Tanner
argues that this term suggests ―powerful sympathetic overtones‖ since it implies that the
protestors are ―the masses.‖ Murray Scot Tanner, China Rethinks Unrest, 27 WASH. Q. 137,
144 (2004).
26. Minxin Pei, supra note 25.
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incidents involved violent clashes with the authorities. 27 Human
Rights Watch reported that official statistics acknowledged 1,500
violent incidents, suicide protests, and demonstrations related to
demolition in 2003. 28 From September to December 2003, Beijing
witnessed almost daily protests against demolition and eviction. 29
Authorities jailed many protesters and attempted to block and prevent
protests by closing off streets. 30 Although critical essays and
anonymous protests on Internet bulletin boards were often tolerated,
protests on the streets were ruthlessly suppressed. 31 ―Incidents of
mass unrest increased nearly 50 percent from 58,000 reported in 2003
to an estimated 90,000 incidents in 2006.‖32
Relations between urban residents, the state, and real estate
developers have increasingly turned combative since the 1980s, when
the implementation of the post-Mao opening-up policy and reforms
encouraged rapid modernization urban development. 33 Faced with
growing problems of land confiscation, forced resettlement, and
inadequate compensation, residents complain to the local government
and also organize for collective action to defend their residential
rights.34 Such campaigns of resistance to local development projects
27. See id.
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 26.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People‘s Republic: Developing a More
Participatory Governance Model in China 1 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-PP-PP_in_the__PRC_FINAL_
91609.pdf.
33. Jiangang Zhu, Not Against the State, Just Protecting the Residents‟ Interests: A
Residents‟ Movement in a Shanghai Neighborhood, PERSP., Sept. 30, 2004, at 25, 25,
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives2/26_093004/Sep04_Issue.pdf. One striking example
reported in the western press is that of Wang Cuyun, who while attempting to prevent a
demolition team from knocking down her house, was allegedly beaten by a worker and
pushed into the ditch that had been dug around her property. ―A bulldozer then covered Mrs.
Wang with earth, burying her alive. By the time relatives had dug her out, she was dead.‖
Malcolm Moore, Chinese Granny Buried Alive by Property Developers, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7374701/Chinesegranny-buried-alive-by-property-developers.html.
34. A great volume of incidents are cataloged and discussed in many fora, including
Human Rights Organizations, government reports, scholarly publications, and news media.
See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5; Annual Report: China 2011, AMNESTY INT‘L
(May 28, 2011), http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-china-2011;
CONG.-EXEC. COMM‘N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 42–43 (2011), http://www.
cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt11/AR2011final.pdf; Valerie Jaffee Washburn, Regular
Takings or Regulatory Takings? Land Expropriation in Rural China, 20 PAC. RIM L. &
POL‘Y J. 71 (2011) (discussing the social unrest in rural China over government takings and
exploring the institutional and legal framework surrounding the practice); Tat-Lin Lay
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navigate China‘s ambiguous transition, in which the State rhetoric
promotes legal reform and the concept of ―rule of law,‖ yet the
authority of the law seems exceedingly deferential to the political
powers of the administrative government.35 Some Chinese observers
suggest that these movements within China‘s cities resemble the
grassroots urban movement that sprang up in the West in opposition
to top-down urban planning.36 The comparison is useful but drawn
too broadly. In the United States, ―urban renewal‖ in the 1950s and
succeeding waves of urban gentrification displaced politically
disadvantaged, lower wealth communities.37 In China‘s contemporary
economic boom, housing privatization and market reforms have
generated tremendous national economic gains, yet as China‘s
citizens are acutely aware, these gains are not shared equally. 38
Minxin Pei has analyzed the present social, economic, and political
ills of China as in a ―trapped transition,‖39 a transformative phase in
which half-finished reforms have transferred power to new, affluent
elites ―who are using crony capitalism to generate high economic
growth that is not sustainable.‖ 40 Popular discontent rises when it
appears that officials invoke the general public‘s interest as

Angus, China's Greatest Leap Forward And The Ones Left Behind—The Twofold Problem
Causing The Rise In Land Disputes: Land Reclamation And Environmental Degradation, 21
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 341, 348 (2008) (observing that in 2006 China saw approximately 23,000
land-related riots—about 2.6 riots every hour); Xiaobo Zhang, Asymmetric Property Rights
in China‟s Economic Growth, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567, 580–84 (2007) (examining
why outside investment growth in China has been strong, despite a relatively weak de jure
property rights system for investors); Michael Wines & Jonathan Ansfield, Trampled in a
Land Rush, Chinese Resist, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2010, at A1.
35. Zhu, supra note 33, at 34.
36. Id. at 26.
37. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1, 47 (2003).
38. See Pamela N. Phan, Enriching The Land or The Political Elite? Lessons From
China On Democratization of The Urban Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM. L. & POL‘Y. J. 607,
619 (2005) (detailing the growth of ―pro-growth coalitions‖ between private developers and
local officials in which the local governments and state-owned enterprises that drive
development decisions ―often possess profit-making interests aligned with the non-public
sector, rather than the local communities they serve‖).
39. Minxin Pei, China is Stagnating in Its “Trapped Transition”, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2006,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2006/02/24/china-is-stagnating-in-its-trappedtransition/bl6.
40. Wing Thye Woo, Assessing China‟s Capability to Manage the High-Probability
Risks to Economic Growth: Fiscal, Governance and Ecological Problems, in POWER AND
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE CHINESE STATE 75, 93 (Keun Lee et al. eds., 2009).
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justification for the land takings, yet it is evident that private land
development pockets the profits.41
II. ―RULE OF LAW‖ PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
tenants-rights activist Xu Honghai described the demolition of his
home:
They forcibly demolished my home when there was no
one at home. When we returned home, my home was gone.
My home was flattened, and turned into ruins. We did not
know where our belongings were . . . For a certain period,
we set up a tent on the ruins for us to live in. But we were
not allowed to live in that tent. My mum suffered from all
of this and she passed away on October 13th . . . Lots of
people put themselves on fire because of demolition . . .
some of them committed suicide because of demolition . . .
some of them took the so-called radical action because of
demolition. I can understand them all.42
The People‘s Republic of China is a young nation. Sixty years
after its formation in bloody revolution and successive decades of
internal chaos, its approach to ―rule of law‖ and lawyers has been by
turns one of rejection, then halting acceptance, followed by an
astonishingly rapid embrace of the ―Rule of Law State‖ model in
2009.43 In 1979, when China reinstated law practice, there were just

41. See Phan, supra note 38, at 640–41. See generally Theresa H. Wang, Trading The
People‟s Homes For The People‟s Olympics: The Property Regime in China, 15 PAC. RIM.
L. & POL‘Y. J. 599 (2006).
42. John Taylor, China Real Estate Boom: People Forced to Leave Their Homes, ABC
ONLINE (Austl.), Nov. 16, 2003, http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2003/
s989831.htm. See also Phan, supra note 38, at 629–30 (describing the forced evictions and
demolition of Liang Xufeng and Chu Jiaquan‘s homes).
43. In 1996, China established ―a socialist rule-of-law state (yifa zhiquo, jianshe shuhui
zhuyi fazhiquo).‖ RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA‘S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 6
(2002). For discussion of the contested meanings of rule-of-law and applications of these
meanings to China, see Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the
Limits of Law: Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China,
19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161 (2001) (exploring to what extent have China‘s legal reforms
been in response to the forces of globalization and China‘s increasing integration into the
global economy); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System With Chinese Characteristics:
China's Discourse For The Rule Of Law And A Bitter Experience, 24 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 1 (2010) (discussing China‘s response to demands for a legal system premised on the
―rule of law‖ through its efforts to develop a socialist legal system that maintains Chinese
characteristics).
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212 lawyers in the entire country.44 In the ensuing years, this number
has increased and China‘s legislators have gained more credentials,
power, and expertise in law making, enacting rafts of new statutes
and even inserting a ―rule of law‖ principle into the Constitution.45
The China Law Society reported that by the end of 2008, lawyers
numbered more than 156,700, the number of law schools expanded to
610, and these enrolled more than 400,000 law students.46
In recent years a panoply of legislative enactments promise
protection for increasingly privatized rights in property. 47 China‘s
legal and political matrix shifted dramatically beginning in 1978,
when the third Constitution and the central committee of the CCP no
longer defined law and legal institutions as instruments of the
proletariat dictatorship, but were instead embraced as a means to
promote modernization. 48 The General Principles of Civil Law,
enacted in 1986, maintains China‘s system of collective and state
property ownership, yet recognizes four rights of ownership: to
possess, use, profit from, and transfer property. 49 The national
Property Rights Law of 2007 allows individuals and entities to own,
buy, sell, lease, and mortgage housing units, although not the land,

44. Zang Dongsheng, Rise of Political Populism and the Trouble with the Legal
Profession in China, HARV. CHINA REV., Jan. 2010, at 79, 80.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The modernization of China‘s laws and legal institutions is significantly related to its
engagement with China‘s desire to participate effectively in global trade and international
influence. Since 1979, more than three hundred laws and regulations have been promulgated,
most pertaining to commercial matters. Bureau of E. Asian and Pac. Affairs, Background
Note: China, U.S. DEP‘T ST. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm
(summarizing legislation designed to modernize and professionalize the nation's lawyers,
judges, and prisons; changes to the criminal law and the criminal procedures laws to
introduce significant reforms; and new laws governing bankruptcy, monopoly, company law
and labor law).
48. Suisheng Zhao, Towards a Rule of Law Regime: Political Reform under China‟s
Fourth Generation of Leadership, in DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW
VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 230, 238 (Suisheng Zhao, ed., 2006).
49. This has been described as a process of borrowing bourgeois theoretical tools to
produce new socialist legal concepts. See Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of
Property Rights in China‟s General Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the
Drafting Process and Beyond, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 185 (1989) (examining the
theoretical tools used by Chinese civil law theorists to draft and analyze property rights, the
system and legal attributes of ownership, and the five kinds of ―rights in things‖). For
discussion of China‘s Civil Law in the context of property, see Frank Xianfeng Huang, The
Path to Clarity: Development of Property Rights in China, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 206–
209 (2004). Laws governing land were enacted experimentally and incrementally. See AMY
L. SOMMERS & KARA L. PHILLIPS, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA: A GUIDE TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 21–26 (2011).
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which continues to belong to the State. 50 Nearly 70% of urban
households owned their own homes in the first decade of the 21st
Century.51
In the last two years, however, China experts are reporting a
significant turn away from law, indicated by intense pressure on
China‘s judges to mediate rather than to adjudicate disputes and to
avoid rulings that will elicit citizen petitions,52 thereby elevating the
central government‘s concerns for social stability over the legal rights
and interests of litigants.53
According to Carl Minzner, this about-face by the PRC is in one
sense part of a global reconsideration of legal norms, one that can be
seen in the United States as well as other nations.54 Minzner argues
that, in China, this is a political calculation to reject many of the legal
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, emblematic of a reconsideration of
the roles of law, lawyers, judges, and adjudication in Chinese
society. 55 Leading legal thinkers in China voice alarm, 56 and law
students quietly question the prospects of law and lawyers to
contribute to further social and political rights development during
their lifetimes. 57 Further, this retreat from ‗rule of law‘ norm
building58 poses both statist and populist risks for China. 59 On one
hand, new official policies reward judges for mediating rather than
ruling in controversial matters, which undermines the development of
legal norms. 60 On the other hand, as the judiciary recedes from
societal flash points, it is also susceptible to populist pressures in
varying forms as citizens devise strategies to coordinate protests in

50. Real Right Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat‘l People‘s Cong., Mar.
16, 2007, effective Mar. 16, 2007), arts. 39, 45, 47 (China).
51. Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 175.
52. See generally Carl F. Minzner, China‟s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935
(2011).
53. See Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Protest
in South China, 44 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 157 (2010) (discussing ‗stability doctrine‘ effects on
courts in southern China).
54. Minzner, supra note 52, at 935. See also Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The
Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 285 (2002).
55. Minzner, supra note 52, at 937.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 972–73.
58. E.g., Hauling Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: Limits
of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 25 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
59. Minzner, supra note 52, at 938–39.
60. Id. at 959–60.
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the streets to sway court outcomes. 61 This retreat erodes the
institutions most central to the Chinese authorities‘ efforts to build a
bulwark against social (and regime) instability.62
Ironically, the pro-adjudication reforms were initiated to
strengthen reliance on legal norms as a means to combat corruption,
reduce local protectionism, and engage citizens in curbing corruption
and abuse of power in the lowest levels of the bureaucracy. 63 But
these legal reforms could not proceed deeply enough, 64 rapidly
enough, to keep pace with the acceleration of citizen grievances that
has accompanied China‘s rapacious economic development.65
―Rights-defense‖ (weiquan) lawyers and movements within
China have garnered attention, praise, and support during the PRC‘s
fitful modernization of its legal institutions.66 These weiquan litigate
issues such as consumer‘s rights, 67 environmental protection, 68
migrants‘ rights, food safety, and challenges to official corruption.69

61. Id. at 962.
62. Id. at 939.
63. See id. at 943.
64. ―Clean‖ countries are so, not by virtue of their criminal law responses to corruption,
but because of strong legal and governance systems that militate against state capture of
productive sectors and administrative corruption. Claus Sandgren, Combatting Corruption:
The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 INT‘L LAW. 717, 727 (2005). Transparency, in the form
of public availability of official information; public procurement systems; reliable reporting
and declaration of salaries and income, process of disgorgement of illicit gains from corrupt
activities. Id.
65. THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33416, SOCIAL UNREST IN CHINA 8
(2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33416.pdf.
66. See generally Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, Weiquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering
in an Authoritarian State: Building a Culture of Public-Interest Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111
(2008) (documenting the development of weiquan lawyering, suggesting a basic taxonomy
of weiquan lawyering and analyzing how different types of weiquan lawyering are helping to
shape to development of civil society within the PRC). See also Keith J. Hand, Using Law
For a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen‟s Action
in the People‟s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 114, 158–60 (2006)
(discussing weiquan lawyering as a model of reform activism).
67. See Shai Oster, For Chinese Consumers, a Superhero, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan.
25, 2000, http://www.csmonitor.com/2000/0125/p1s5.html.
68. For an excellent survey of citizen-led environmental activism, see Wang Canfa,
Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies And Suggested Reforms, 8
VT J. ENVTL. L. 161 (2007).
69. On citizen-led protests, see Ben W. Heineman Jr., In China, Corruption and Unrest
Threaten Autocratic Rule, ATLANTIC, June 29, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2011/06/in-china-corruption-and-unrest-threaten-autocraticrule/241128/ (discussing recent social protests and their link with official corruption as
indicators of ineffective political and legal institutions to redress grievances).
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Governmental response to lawyers aiding demolition displacees
illuminate the despair felt by many regular Chinese when they seek to
defend their new legal rights and hold government officials
accountable. Many inadvertently became weiquan lawyers when they
came into conflict with the police while representing clients
challenging the forced demolition of their homes.70 Shanghai lawyer
Zheng Enchong has been illegally confined at home for the past five
years since his completion of a three-year prison term. 71 Beijing
advocate Ni Yulan is again being prosecuted; her legs were
irreparably broken during a previous detention.72
The political fault line remains whether these weiquan
campaigns can be deemed both ―regime supportive‖ and ―rights
upholding‖ at the same time. Thus far, there is scant evidence that
this is the official view.73 In a state comfortable with the rule of law,
proponents‘ appeal to provisions in the nation‘s laws and the
constitution in challenging local governments would not be seen as
anti-regime actions. 74 However, China‘s legal framework is not
sufficient to trump the perception by the governing authorities that
rights-defense activity risks destabilizing society.75 Professor Jerome
Cohen illustrates this point with the case of Chen Guangcheng, a selftaught lawyer who exposed forced sterilizations of Chinese women,
and who was subsequently jailed for more than four years in 2006,
ostensibly for disrupting traffic and damaging property:
Chen Guangcheng never saw himself as a ―troublemaker‖
bent on damaging social stability and harmony. Indeed, he
wanted to improve stability and harmony by using legal
institutions to process social grievances in an orderly way
70. Jerome A. Cohen, China‟s Lawyers Under Siege, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/nov/08/chinas-lawyers-under-siege/.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., id. (debunking myths that persecution of lawyers and legal activists who
bring cases under the new laws are either rare, legally justified, or local officials run amok
without the approval of the central government); Peter Foster, China „Waging Offensive‟
Against Human Rights Lawyers, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/6147086/China-waging-offensive-against-human-rightslawyers.html (reporting an Amnesty International study of ―unprecedented offensive‖
against lawyers who brought petitions to challenge state-sanctioned land grabs or other legalrights assertion).
74. See Cohen, supra note 70.
75. For crackdowns on lawyers, see id.; Eva Pils, The Practice of Law as Conscientious
Resistance: Chinese Weiquan Lawyers‟ Experience, in THE IMPACT OF CHINA‘S 1989
TIANANMEN MASSACRE 109 (Jean-Philippe Béja ed., 2011).
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as prescribed by law. His only mistake was to accept the
law as it was written, as a true believer in the power and
promise of China‘s legal reforms.76
In the balance of the paper, I view China‘s popular discontent
over the dislocation, destitution and indignities of official land-grabs
through the frame of the accountable-development advocacy
movement that has arisen in the United States. My purpose is to
consider the potential for convergences between Chinese citizens‘
impassioned desire for accountability from their officials and to
discern in what quarters of modern China‘s nascent civil-society
sector accountable-development advocacy might take root.77
III. ACCOUNTABLE DEVELOPMENT
The demolition refugees in China and in the United States share
fundamental concerns to mitigate the negative impacts of
development. Many in China desire replacement housing, more
complete compensation, and accountability by officials for the harms
inflicted on targeted communities. In cases of land confiscation and
home evictions, much of the popular anger has been directed at
collusive deals between local officials and private investors and the
lack of fair compensation to ordinary citizens.
The fundamental idea of accountability entails officials
answerable to the public for their actions. Increasing incidents of
social unrest are widely understood to relate to the developing rights
awareness of many Chinese citizens, likely aided by the small but
passionate networks of rights lawyers, citizen activists, and the
Internet. Whereas the dominant theoretical understanding in
international and national development practice has focused on topdown mechanisms such as elections, hearings, and consultations, a
correlative element of accountability theory in development practice
is the promotion of citizens‘ power, participation, and engagement at
local levels in order to encourage more accountable and responsive
government. Accountability in the context of development is better
understood as a fiduciary rather than a political-process concept,
inferring a duty in the stewardship of public resources to extract and
fairly distribute the benefits as well as the burdens of the resources
under management.

76. Cohen, supra note 70.
77. See infra Part III.
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The turn to accountable-development practice in the United
States arose in response to the unequal distribution of the benefits of
urban development (the public), while its burdens of displacement
and destruction are borne by few.78
A.

Accountable Development as Cause Lawyering

Today, the field of Community Economic Development (CED)
is practiced by community-based organizations and advocates, and is
a distinct field of ―cause lawyering‖ 79 in the United States and
arguably, in campaigns around the world. It has evolved in the United
States in the second half of the twentieth century, a period of
tremendous contestation, flux, and innovation.80
William Simon‘s seminal study portrays CED as an orientation
to deploy an assemblage of legal strategies animated by a set of social
policies and grassroots practices that promote neighborhood
revitalization.81 It is a cause-oriented model of law practice in that the
clients are typically communities or key nonprofit organizations
within neighborhoods in need of economic development.82 It features
transactional forms of practice familiar to the vast majority of
American lawyers. 83 CED lawyers negotiate deals between
community-based nonprofit organizations, public funders, and private
investors. 84 ―Whereas cause lawyers have traditionally sought to
mobilize claims of legal rights to advance systemic reform, CED
lawyers attempt to mobilize community participation to change local

78. PRITCHETT, supra note 37, at 6. In the American context, the ―few‖ are most often
poor minorities residents. See J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low-Income Residential
Communities Under the Takings Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 131, 152 & n.63
(2005) (―In Baltimore, for example, urban renewal and highway project demolition displaced
10,000 families, 90% of whom were black.‖).
79. The growing literature on ―cause lawyering‖ has yet to produce a precise definition
since it is in constant transition as to adjust to changing configurations of state power, and
thus, cause lawyering takes many forms around the globe. Generally, cause lawyering
denotes the practice of law by those committed to furthering various ideological or
redistributive causes by legal means, within or beyond the profession‘s mainstream norms.
See generally CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
80. See supra note 79.
81. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW,
BUSINESS AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001).
82. Id. at 3.
83. See generally id.
84. Id. at 47.
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economic circumstances through the creation of innovative
institutional structures.‖85
The origins of the American movement for accountable
development can be traced to the war on poverty‘s populist
inclusionary policies, and in strenuous reaction to slum neighborhood
destruction in the 1950s. 86 Socially and economically, this was a
transitional time for America‘s industrial cities. As the national
economy and its new interstate highway system began to take shape,
these industrial cities lost manufacturers and shed jobs. Federally
financed loans promoted the rapid growth of the suburbs. The
distribution of benefits in a robust market economy was extremely
uneven. African Americans and other minority populations whose
mobility remained severely limited by racial or economic
discrimination, were disproportionately left out, excluded from the
promise that all Americans could become full participants in a postWorld War II ―consumer republic.‖87 The CED movement arose out
of this struggle of urban, inner-city residents to access public and
private capital to build and operate essential community facilities and
services, such as the construction or rehabilitation of affordable
housing; employment innovations such as microenterprises and
worker-owned cooperatives; and services that local markets did not
provide to their neighborhoods, including affordable child care,
health care, and access to credit.88
The 1980s, however, ushered in a strong backlash against
government-sponsored antipoverty programs. The social welfare
safety net for the nation‘s poorest was curtailed as federal and state
administrative agencies were redirected to eschew centralized federal
regulation in favor of more local, market-oriented models of
governance suggested by the practices of ―privatization‖ of agency

85. Scott Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in
the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS supra note 79, at 302,
303 (emphasis in original).
86. SIMON, supra note 81, at 7–13. See also JAMES A. KUSHNER ET AL., HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 518–22 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing state
and federal urban renewal laws). For the classic critique of Urban Renewal and its
devastation of intact neighborhoods, see MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949–1962 (1964).
87. See generally HOWARD GILLETTE, JR., CAMDEN AFTER THE FALL: DECLINE AND
RENEWAL IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY (2005) (chronicling the history and examining the
cumulative effects of urban decline in a post-industrial city).
88. KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 86, at 502.
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service provision and decision-making. 89 In addition, the federal
courts became measurably less receptive to claims of civil, economic
or social rights.
―Gentrification‖ describes much of the urban redevelopment that
has taken place in the United States90 and the term applies as well to
China‘s rush to remake its cities. In the United States, gentrification
is widely understood as the process by which middle- and upperincome people move into previously lower-income neighborhoods to
redevelop, revitalize, and revamp the community to suit them.
Official justifications typically include the need to replace poorquality housing with higher-quality housing. 91 The experience of
abrupt brutal destruction of residents‘ livelihoods in China has
garnered the more fitting name, ―life-world destruction.‖92
Gentrification in the United States commenced with federal aid
for ―slum clearance‖ in the 1950s, 93 with little protection for the
residents of decaying neighborhoods. 94 The underlying theory was
that the destruction of run-down housing would also remove the
problems of crime and poverty associated with it, thereby benefitting
both the ejected residents and the city as a whole.95

89. See generally MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF
PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996).
90. Gentrification in the United States has been the topic of considerable study and
analysis by scholars and practitioners in law, sociology, urban planning, and geography. J.
Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405–07 (2003). There is
some debate about whether gentrification necessarily implies that the lower-income people
who live in the neighborhood are pushed out, but indisputably, often lower-income residents
are relocated to make room for higher-income residents. See KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 86,
at 581.
91. E.g., THOMAS J. CAMPANELLA, THE CONCRETE DRAGON: CHINA‘S URBAN
REVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE WORLD 123–27 (2008) (describing the extensive
destruction of the hutong neighborhoods and courtyard houses that blanketed Beijing for
hundreds of years to make way for two new ring roads, eight new subway lines, a ninety-six
mile light rail system, and to eliminate environments and people deemed unsightly or
problematic by the central government).
92. YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at 73.
93. Initially, the federal government took a leading role in funding urban redevelopment,
but in 1949, the federal Housing Act provided funds to local governments, which used the
funding primarily for slum clearance. See Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined:
Revitalizing the Central City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689, 699–701
(1994).
94. KUSHNER ET AL., supra note 86, at 581–84.
95. Id. at 700–01. See also Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much
Struggle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 37, 40 (2006).
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Contemporary China‘s rapidly remade cityscapes share the key
features of gentrification with American-style urban renewal. The
legal frameworks provide what in practice are merely nominal
procedural rights and substantive compensation for the poor whose
neighborhoods are bulldozed, and the newly built city amenities
benefit higher-income others, with the costs borne disproportionately
by the displaced. As in China today, during America‘s slum
clearance, low-income housing that was cleared under the U.S.
Housing Act was replaced with high-cost housing, and the law lacked
effective requirements for the replacement of the low-cost housing
that redevelopment destroyed.96
Compulsory displacements that occur to accommodate new
development raise major questions of social justice because they
redistribute the losses and benefits of the development between
particular interest-holders. Government officials, wielding the power
to direct land and public resources into the redesign of urban spaces,
in effect terminate the residency of some in order to construct shiny
new private residences, shops, and entertainment venues for affluent
in-movers. 97 In the United States, as in China, the restructuring of
urban space by cities adapting to global economic changes adversely
impacts the ability of low-income residents to remain. The
inequitable allocation of ineluctable burden upon the displaced
contrasts acutely with the vast wealth appropriated by the officialdeveloper coalition, providing palatial new urban amenities for a
wealthy few. In the United States, citizens and communities are
changing the face of urban development through innovative strategies
that offer more equitable and inclusive models for redevelopment.
In the U.S. context, the goal of CED is to revitalize disinvested
neighborhoods targeted for reinvestment: to create physical,
economic, and redistributive change in the planned project that
delivers more affordable housing, employment opportunity, and other
community amenities to the residents who face displacement. 98 For
its proponents, CED expresses commitments to bottom-up
neighborhood revitalization in lieu of state-sponsored or purely
private market-driven redevelopment priorities. 99 Central CED
96. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and
the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 316–17 (2004).
97. Bezdek, supra note 95, at 37–38.
98. SIMON, supra note 81, at 69–72.
99. Id. at 114–18 (detailing six common types of organizational vehicles used by
communities to provide legal form to their equity-enhancing activities).
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principles have long been used to redefine redevelopment in order to
minimize resident displacement and to strengthen membership in a
geographically defined community, including the security of
possession or ownership.100 The ―Accountable Development‖ strand
of CED that has emerged in several U.S. cities seeks more forcefully
to change city redevelopment policies by increasing community
participation in the planning process, and compelling developers and
local government agencies to redesign proposed development
projects to be responsive to the needs of low-income residents in the
project area. 101 A key component of many of these campaigns for
accountable development has been a negotiated Community Benefits
Agreement (CBA) through which the affected community obtains
from the private developers, with city assent, specific agreements to
provide specified levels of affordable housing, jobs, job training,
wages, and other elements, in exchange for the community‘s support
for public subsidies and required official approvals.102
Typically, the means for securing a CBA is the leveraging of
government programs and approvals for the private developer‘s
project. Accountability to the impacted community is engineered into
the governing development agreements and official approvals,
through resident participation in formulation of project objectives,103
specific outcome targets, 104 reporting and monitoring provisions, 105
and increasingly, clawback provisions to retrieve public subsidies in
the event the private developer fails to perform.106
100. Id. at 143–44.
101. Bezdek, supra note 95, at 108–10.
102. See generally JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE (2005), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org
/pdf/cba2005final.pdf. These agreements are contracts that ―almost always contain wage and
hiring goals and may also include a grab bag of concessions, like a day care center, a new
park, free tickets to sports events and cash outlays to be administered by the groups
themselves.‖ Terry Pristin, Square Feet: In Major Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2006, at C6.
103. See generally Patricia Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social Justice and the
Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing
Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 113 (2008).
104. See Community Benefits: Practical Tools for Proactive Development, PARTNERSHIP
WORKING FAMILIES 13 (2008), http://communitybenefits.org/downloads/CBTools
forProactiveDevelopment.pdf.
105. Id. at 4.
106. See generally Community Benefits: Practical Tools for Proactive Development,
PARTNERSHIP WORKING FAMILIES (2008), http://communitybenefits.org/downloads/CBTools
forProactiveDevelopment.pdf. CBAs are arguably an extension of the long history in the
United States of negotiations among developers, public officials and land use agencies, and
affected community and other stakeholder groups such as environmental advocates and
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In practice, the resulting public-private agreement is likely to
augment the interests of the project participants.107 This form of law
practice contributes to the norm-building project of society less
directly than rule-of-law discourse generally contemplates. CED
instantiates a collaborative approach to collective action, and unlike
the weiquan efforts in China, it is not state-oriented, seeking no rule
change by court or legislature. CED as a form of legal action is
essentially a collaboration between community-based actors, together
with state and market players, to generate solutions to the problems
of poverty, urban disinvestment, and economic transition. 108 Rather
than look to public law as a source of constraint on powerful market
actors or of rights expansion, CED utilizes private law to devise
collaborative relationships that increase access to outside investment
in the neighborhood, enlarge community participation in decisions
about the development, and distributes economic benefits
equitably. 109 Where more traditional public-interest rights-oriented
cause lawyering aims to achieve universal public benefit, CED strives
to produce a set of enhancements to a particular, geographic
community of collective yet private interest holders.110
The role for lawyers in American CED campaigns is constitutive
rather than litigious: lawyers help communities to navigate the
process of real estate development, negotiate legal agreements,
arrange access to capital, structure business entities, and counsel
them as to compliance with tax, corporate, and regulatory
requirements. U.S. transactional law practice rarely turns on direct
assertion of legal or political rights. It is instead the expression of a
profoundly law-embracing society that helps private economic actors
to order their affairs in mutually beneficial respects.
B.

The Translation Potential for “Community Development‖

PRC citizens discussing ―community development‖—at least, in
English, with the author—have a hard time conceiving of
development activities taking place at the initiative of any entities
other than local or provincial government or their designees. This
reflects the uniquely Chinese structure of residential social,
organized labor. William Ho, Community Benefits Agreements: An Evolution in Public
Benefits Negotiation Process, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7, 9
(2008).
107. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 103, at 121–22.
108. SIMON, supra note 81, at 41–46.
109. Id. at 69–78.
110. Id. at 41–43.
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geographic, and physical space implemented in Mao-era cities.
Community development is of course significantly defined by the
political, cultural, social, and economic realities of the particular
countries and communities where it is undertaken. The profound
differences between the two nations‘ framework of laws, legal
institutions, and cultures of disputing, rights-bearing, and citizenship,
are essential sides of the prism of this analysis as well. The United
States is a modern, prosperous, liberal welfare state, and practices of
rights assertion and community advocacy formed in the crucible of its
legal institutions and cultures of rights and rights assertion, cannot be
sensibly proffered for introduction on the other side of the globe.
IV. POTENTIAL CIVIL SOCIETY CLAIMANTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE
DEVELOPMENT WITHIN CHINA‘S RESTRUCTURING URBAN SPACE
If ―accountable development‖ can translate to China‘s distinct
social, political, and legal frameworks, in what settings might the
concept find sufficient independence from both State and privatemarket powers?
A.

Community Mobilization Strategies to Sidestep Inhospitable
Legal Establishment

Within the U.S. frame that informs community development
practice, communities are places of social, economic, and human
interdependence. These are the sites of our housing, education, health
care, daily convenience shopping, the places where we raise our
children, and engage in the many other activities that sustain us
physically, emotionally, socially, and psychologically.111 Thus, they
are vital for the preservation of society. Land use is an essential
ingredient for communities as they develop or preserve their
character and pursue shared purposes.112 Land-use law is one of the
primary ways that communities establish priorities, and address
fiscal, aesthetic, service, and lifestyle needs of their residents.113
In Western nations with social-democratic traditions,
―community‖ is a social space standing between the individual and
the State. Community is understood as a social space able to mediate
111. James DeFilippis & Susan Saegert, Communities Develop: The Question Is How?, in
THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT READER 1, 3 (James DeFilippis & Susan Saegert, eds.,
2008).
112. Id. at 4.
113. See generally THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT READER (James DeFilippis & Susan
Saegert, eds., 2008).
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the relationship between the people and the government. This
includes initiating self-help to address needs and provide services that
the government is unwilling or unable to provide.
B.

From Mao to Market Housing

Such talk of ―community‖ in the American CED sense has no
ready corollaries in China‘s modern history. A major feature of
China‘s urban transformation is the profound transition underway in
the structure of residential environments. The socialist cities of the
Mao era were developed under a centrally planned economy, whose
basic unit was the work unit (danwei), the site through which the
state provided jobs, housing, meals, education, and healthcare.114 The
danwei was the center of social and economic life for most urban
residents. The result was a peculiarly cellular city structure: Chinese
socialist cities comprised of numerous independent workplace-based
communities.115 Each danwei was enclosed by a high wall and gate
which produced the distinctly collectivized social life and socialist
governance among co-residents.116 Political education and oversight
were achieved in each of the PRC‘s urban residential neighborhoods
through the elaborate and well-organized institution called the
Residents Committee or street committee, established by the
Communist Party in most major cities shortly after taking power in
1949. 117 The English word ―Community‖ translates as shequ—a
structure of close social and political control by the socialist state, the
antithesis of the free-space understood in contemporary American
community theory.
Further complicating a contemporary Chinese translation is the
complex of policies of the central government to modernize China‘s
cities as economic engines. In the post-Mao era, policies of the
central government aim to transform the State-run planned economy
into a market economy. The danwei‟s demise has been overshadowed
in Western scholarship by the dramatic transformation of the physical

114. David Bray, Garden Estates and Social Harmony: A Study into the Relationship
Between Residential Planning and Urban Governance in Contemporary China, 4 (2011),
available at http://web.mit.edu/dusp/chinaplanning/paper/Bray%20paper.pdf.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. In terms of political geography, the danwei compound effectively symbolized two
interrelated principals: the primacy of the socialist Party in maintaining the nation, and the
significance of labor to socialist practice. Id. at 6.
117. See Bong-ho Mok, Grassroots Organizing in China: The Residents' Committee as a
Linking Mechanism Between the Bureaucracy and the Community, 23 COMMUNITY DEV. J.
164 (1988) (explaining the role of residents committees in China).
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and economic restructuring of Chinese cities. Rapid razing of
hundreds of square miles of low-rise housing, industrial, and
commercial buildings of the socialist decades is yielding an
enormous number of huge new housing estates. These estates are
privately developed, entrance is by purchase rather than government
assignment, and are highly differentiated by price.118 Primarily they
house the emerging middle and wealthy classes. 119 In this context,
―the community‖ has emerged to replace danwei.
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has promoted the
strategy of ―community building‖ through ―community‖ units based
on place of residence to re-organize the urban population within
China‘s rapidly changing urbanism. This strategy is founded upon the
Residents Committee system of the Mao era. The ―community‖ unit
has grown larger, its staff more professionalized, and its delegated
responsibilities considerable. 120 Like the Residents Committees of
old, the community is officially a ―mass organization,‖ thus in
addition to its health and welfare duties, one of its principal
responsibilities is to mobilize ―the masses‖ to participate as
volunteers in the provision of daily maintenance and security work.121
In the United States, lawyering on behalf of grass-roots
communities in the path of planned redevelopment is dependent upon
mobilization by marginalized social groups to contest the plans of the
state and market actors, and extract some participation and material
benefit from the project as ultimately built. 122 The usual terrain of
lawyering—the parameters set by the state for legal intervention such
as substantive legal rights and procedural rules—recede as the locus
of the lawyers‘ representation shifts from the court house to the
bargaining table.
In a small way, this turn to bargaining rather than litigation for
legal rights, can be compared to the ―turn from law‖ in China,
discussed in the first section of this paper. After a period of
expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, the very tools of liberal public
interest litigators were restricted: Congress stripped federally funded
118. BRAY, supra note 114, at 8.
119. Id. See also Min Zhou and John R. Logan, Market Transition and the
Commodification of Housing in Urban China, in THE NEW CHINESE CITY: GLOBALIZATION
AND MARKET REFORM 137–152 (John R. Logan, ed., 2002) (analyzing housing and real
estate development reform in Chinese urban cities).
120. Id. at 10–11.
121. Id. at 11–12.
122. See generally Salkin & Lavine, supra note 103.
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legal services lawyers of the authority to bring class action lawsuits,
and barred them from lobbying, collecting attorney‘s fees, and
engaging in political advocacy.123
Consequently, numerous mobilized communities and their cause
lawyers have found ―accountable development‖ to be a campaign that
can gain traction within the shifted social policy framework, even
though its prospects in court are speculative at best. 124 This is a
constructive extra-judicial civic space that has the capacity to effect
local change and potential to contribute to norm-production in a way
that might be translatable to the PRC.
The principal form of private association that arose in the United
States to express communities‘ interests in urban restructuring was
the Community Development Corporation (CDC). 125 CDCs were
often formed in response to local controversies, such as slum
clearance and redlining by financial institutions.126 A long-standing
tenet of community development is that CDCs should be indigenous
with governing boards comprised of area residents, businesses, and
civic leaders.127 Local groups, it was reasoned, would be more in tune
with residents‘ needs and could give poor people more control over
their communities.128 Many of the early CDCs received funds from
the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, and philanthropies such
as the Ford Foundation.129

123. See generally David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (2003). In addition, the Supreme Court
limited attorney‘s fee awards in civil rights and environmental cases and some states have
enacted caps on attorney‘s fees and damage awards, while restricting the ability of law
school clinics to undertake controversial cases. See generally Ann Southworth, Conservative
Lawyers and the Contest Over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law,‖ 52 UCLA L. REV.
1223 (2005).
124. See generally Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as
Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 399 (describing the integration of progressive social policy reforms into CED projects).
125. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
126. Cummings, supra note 85, at 451–54.
127. Yael Krigman, The Role of Community Development Corporations in Affordable
Housing, 19 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 231, 242–43 (2010).
128. See Salkin & Lavine, supra 103, at 114–15.
129. For accounts of the organization, funding, and activities of CDCs, see ROBERT
HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBORHOOD INITIATIVES TO
ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995) and NEAL R. PEIRCE & CAROL F.
STEINBACH, CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION 19–26 (1987).
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CDCs in the United States provide an alternative model to
government administration of comprehensive community programs,
and thus are a significant form of citizen empowerment. 130 The
repeated experience around the country demonstrates that ordinary
people have many of the skills of analysis and judgment needed to
direct community development. 131 A significant share of CDCs
generates housing for people with special needs. CDCs are
increasingly being asked by other local institutions to develop
community-serving facilities, especially day care centers, health care
centers, youth centers, arts programs, and other social service
providers.
C. Building Civil Society: Sites of Potential Community Mobilizing
for Accountable Development in the PRC
Since Alexis de Tocqueville toured a young United States, the
idea that the durability and quality of democracy increases with the
number of citizens actively engaged in their communities has been a
major tenet of democratic theory. 132 This remains an attractive
proposition because of the importance attributed to ordinary citizens,
ascribing to men and women in the street the potential to influence
decisions that govern their lives.133
―Civil society‖ is theorized as the realm of organized social life
that is ―voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting,
autonomous form the state, and bound by a legal order or set of
shared rules.‖134 In liberal-democratic political theory, a strong and
diverse civil society is necessary to guard against excesses of
unchecked state power, an essential complement to strengthen the
state‘s capacity for good governance, and to assure its
accountability. 135 Mobilizing structures that connect individuals to
groups, such as NGOs, community associations, and work or

130. Cummings, supra note 85, at 443–44.
131. See generally Salkin & Lavine, supra note 103.
132. Philip C. Kissam, Alexis De Tocqueville and American Constitutional Law: On
Democracy, the Majority Will, Individual Rights, Federalism, Religion, Civic Associations,
and Originalist Constitutional Theory, 59 ME. L. REV. 35, 47 (2007).
133. See id. at 61–62.
134. Claire Mercer, NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of the
Literature, 2 PROGRESS DEV. STUD. 5, 7 (2002), available at http://pdj.sagepub.com/content/
2/1/5.
135. Id. at 8.
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friendship, can bring people together to act in collective selfinterest.136
China‘s context is of course quite different. Kevin O‘Brien and
Rachael Stern describe ―rightful resistance‖ which hinges on
protesters locating support at higher levels for their efforts to check
local misconduct.137 The Chinese state is not a disciplined institution
advancing distinct goals, but rather a contest among disparate actors
to advance particular interests.138
The remainder of this section briefly surveys four loci in China‘s
evolving civil-society sector, with particular reference to their
potential to contribute to ‗accountable-development‘ actions: shequs,
homeowners associations, migrant enclaves in powerhouse cities, and
China‘s emerging NGO sector.
1.

Shequs: Administrative ―Neighborhoods‖ and Democratic
Experimentation

An unavoidable feature of the PRC‘s urban residential
neighborhoods is the elaborate and well-organized institution called
the Residents Committee. The Communist Party established these in
most major cities shortly after taking power in 1949.139 Their primary
tasks include the maintenance of sociopolitical order and the
provision of social services such as sanitation, basic welfare for the
handicapped and disadvantaged, literacy education, and mediation of
civil disputes. 140 To the Party, if democratization is to be a public
good, it has to be orderly, and such neighborhood party organizations
are the ―stabilizing force‖ in the process of democratic

136. Id.
137. Kevin J. O‘Brien and Rachel E. Stern, Introduction: Studying Contention in
Contemporary China, in POPULAR PROTEST IN CHINA 11, 14 (Kevin J. O‘Brien ed., 2008).
138. Id.
139. Bung-ho Mok, supra note 117, at 164.
140. Chow Bing Ngeow, Democratic Development in China‟s Urban Communities 44–46
(Jan. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University), available at
http://iris.lib.neu.edu/pub_int_aff_diss/7/ [hereinafter Chow Bing Ngeow, Democratic
Development] (explaining democratic electoral innovations at the ‗street level‘ and
community level (shequ) of local governance committees). For a discussion of the Residents'
Committees and a bibliography of previous work about them, see Benjamin L. Read,
Revitalizing the State's Urban “Nerve Tips”, 163 CHINA Q., 806 (2000). In 2000, the
Ministry of Civil Affairs began referring to these organizations as Community Residents'
Committees (shequ jumin weiyuanhui). Jie Chen et al., Popular Support for Grassroots SelfGovernment in Urban China: Findings from a Beijing Survey, 33 MODERN CHINA 505, 505
(2007).
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development. 141 China has been experimenting with enlarging the
roles of residents in the governance of their neighborhoods since
1991 when the Ministry of Civil Affairs proposed a national plan for
transforming the Resident‘s Committee into a welfare provider, 142
with the policy objective to ease the state‘s welfare burden while
maintaining its political control.143
As a consequence of their expanded functions, a growing
number of shequs bear some resemblance to many American CDCs
in terms of their neighborhood-level activities. Some shequs have
expanded their roles beyond their formal mandates because of the
confluence of new social problems, a legal obligation to provide
services, and an absence of the central government.144 In one Jimo
City, just outside of Qingdao, a shequ became an active market
participant by providing jobs directly to residents.145
Elsewhere, shequs have provided medical services, vocational
education, service hotlines, and job placement services.146
Nonetheless, shequs are not likely to be a significant crucible for
a American-style grassroots movement that challenges the market
forces of urban redevelopment, because of shequs‟ defining
characteristics. The first is state dependence. Although shequs are
supposed to be the embodiment of the local community, in general,
residents have been unwilling to become involved as authentic
volunteers.147 Second, shequs suffer from legal ambiguity. Although
the shequ experiment has been sanctioned by the central government,
shequs have no legal standing. 148 Without legal status, shequ
operations are completely dependent on the discretion of government
officials.

141. Chow Bing Ngeow, Community Party Building in Urban China, 2 INT‘L J. OF CHINA
STUD. 213, 227–28 (2011) [hereinafter Chow Bing Ngeow, Community Party].
142. Miu Chung Yan & Jian Guo Gao, Social Engineering of Community Building:
Examination of Policy Process and Characteristics of Community Construction in China, 42
COMMUNITY DEV. J. 222, 225 (2007).
143. Chow Bing Ngeow, Community Party, supra note 141, at 222. The common term in
the West is ―community building.‖ In China, however, the official translation of this policy
is ―community construction.‖ Id.
144. James Derleth & Daniel R. Koldyk, The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political
Reform in Urban China, 13 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 747, 757 (2004).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 766.
148. Id.
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Homeowners Committees/Associations

In contrast, the development of the homeowners‘ committees
(yezhu weiyuanhui) within urban shequs evidences a new and
different form and potential for grassroots democratic development.
The formal expression of the legal rights of homeowners instantiated
in the Property Law of 2007 helps to articulate a class of interests not
shared by the home-owning subset of residents within a shequ. The
homeowners‘ committee within the new housing estates has more
capacity for representing and articulating the interests of urban
resident-homeowners.149 Yet it has no correlative legal responsibility
for doing so, since the Ministry of Civil Affairs policy documents and
other official discourse on ―grassroots democracy‖ direct attention to
the elections and democratic governance of the shequ residents‘
committee, to which the homeowners‘ committee is subordinate.150
The homeowners‘ committee present an ambiguous class base
in China, compared to U.S. ‗accountable development‘ actions which
have commonly been pursued by residents of low-wealth
communities threatened by forces of gentrifying redevelopment
projects which are facilitated by local government in the anticipation
of higher municipal revenues from taxes paid by commercial
ventures and higher-end residential in-movers.151
3.

Migrant Enclaves

Rural-to-urban migrants and their urban settlements invariably
come up when examining the development of post-reform Chinese
cities. One scholar described the situation as:

149. Chow Bing Ngeow, Democratic Development, supra note 140, at 244. For
discussion of the property-restitution protests by owners of private homes socialized during
the Revolution, which took shape in the late 1990s, see YOU-TIEN HSING, supra note 1, at
63–72.
150. Id. at 242–46. Whereas a shequ is the lowest level of governmental administration,
these homeownership settings are buildings or blocks of buildings either privatized or newly
built by private developers since the housing reform. In US usage these xiaoqu might better
translate to ‗housing development.‘ A shequ likely encompasses several xiaoqu, although a
particularly large development might be coextensive with a shequ. Both Ngbeow and several
of my law students in Shanghai in 2011 translate xiaoqu as ‗neighborhood‘, although they
lack experience of urban American neighborhoods to substantiate an equivalence or
approximation.
151. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 103, at 130 (―While CBAs have promise of
achieving otherwise unattainable social justice goals . . . CBAs [are] yet untested and still in
their infancy.‖). See also Bezdek, supra note 95, at 57–59 (discussing the nature of
displacement in the United States because of city redevelopment).
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China‘s rural migrants in cities are continually classified as
a part of the rural population under the household
registration (hukou) system, they have failed to receive
official recognition as urban citizens and have been
unjustly excluded from the rights and benefits of city
residents. In response to this exclusion, Chinese rural-tourban migrants have made a collective effort to overcome
their impoverished surroundings by clustering in the
suburbs of major cities and forming their own settlements,
usually with other migrants from the same hometowns.
Through these settlements, migrants have been able to
create their own villages—or enclaves—with independent
schools, medical services, and even their own type of
security force.152
The political claims of these enclaves are based on seeking
inclusion in the socialist state‘s responsibilities for social provision.
Nonetheless, their creation and operations entail significant citizeninitiative in a form of community development that bears further
study. For enclaves cleared away as part of urban reconstruction,
their destruction occurs absent legal protection, although their shared
territorial identity and the loss of physical anchors for work, family,
community, and services may launch residents into protest actions.
4.

Non-Governmental, Not-for-Profit Organizations

A recurrent theme in the English-language literature on NGOs is
the view of civil society as a microcosm of democratic process and
the association of grassroots civil movements with the articulation of
people‘s aspirations.153
After coming to power in 1949, Chinese Communists suppressed
civil society well into the late 1970s. 154 Since then, the regulatory
environment and society space for non-state actors‘ roles in China
152. Jong-Ho Jeong, From illegal migrant settlements to central business and residential
districts: Restructuring of urban space in Beijing‟s migrant enclaves, 35 HABITAT INT‘L.
508, 508 (2011).
153. See Claire Mercer, NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of
the Literature, 2 PROGRESS IN DEV. STUD. 5, 19 (2002), available at http://pdj.sagepub.com/
content/2/1/5 (cautioning that the roles of NGOs in democratic development are interpreted
from a range of viewpoints, including the international financial institutions which
themselves blur the distinction between the NGO and state sectors).
154. Jillian S. Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal
and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China Today, 26 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 29,
38 n.32 (2008).
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have been on a roller coaster from zero tolerance in 1978, trending
upward in official toleration and number and variety of organizations,
and punctuated by significant setbacks.155 A dramatic burst of citizenorganized groups was evident in the 1980s, but this trajectory was
halted in the spring of 1989, when the Tiananman Square protests
revealed the capacity of student, worker, and citizen resident
associations to call for political reform, 156 prompting the central
government to issue new Regulations on Registration and
Management of Social Organizations. 157 The 1989 regulations
established a dual-management system, which requires every social
organization to gain approval and oversight by both the central
Ministry for Civil Affairs and a supervisory agency in the social
organization‘s field of endeavor.158
Today estimates of the number of NGOs in China are close to
three million, yet experts readily acknowledge that the reality is
impossible to establish since a majority are not registered. 159 Even
more difficult to distinguish within China‘s socialist governance
structure is the number of these which may have paid staff and even
national or international support, and those which are ―grassroots‖
organizations, which are typically smaller, issue-based, have little
financial support, and are consequently ephemeral. 160 While no
comprehensive account can be offered of grassroots or more
formalized citizen-initiated civil-society organizations, there is a
growing body of evidence of the expansion of this aspect of
contemporary China.
The energetic emergence of a ‗third sector‘ between the
omnipresent Chinese state and its rampant marketization invites
consideration of NGOs as building blocks of civil society—possibly,
as engines of democracy, and plausibly, as precursors to community
economic development organizations ―with Chinese characteristics.‖
The Chinese system of legal registration operates to manage and
control the rise of social organizations. Yet the many conflicting
political and economic incentives for both NGOs and government
155. Id. at 38.
156. Id. at 39.
157. See id. at 42–45 (describing the key regulatory provisions for social organizations).
158. Id. at 39–40 (recounting significant drops in the number of registered NGOs at
multiple points in time).
159. See Deyong Yin, China‟s Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2009).
160. Id. See also Mercer, supra note 134, at 6.
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must complicate decisions by citizens to pursue social organization
registration in China.161
NGOs do appear, however, to offer an experimental terrain in
which to combine citizen initiatives with governmental cooperation
and oversight through the dual management requirement (sufficient
to guard against the subversive potential of NGOs), and with
capacity-building support from international NGOs.
To illustrate: One of the most well-known ‗community
development‘ NGOs in China today is Shining Stone Community
Action, a civic non-profit organization that provides consulting and
training services to facilitate participation-based urban community
development in China. 162 Founded in December 2002 by Song
Qinghua and others, its mission is to ―disseminate participatory ideas
and methods, promote community participation, and build
harmonious community.‖163 The organization‘s primary activity is to
promote participation-based approaches to community governance
and development, and Shining Stone has developed a training
program on socially sustainable communities and leadership
development specifically for Chinese community leaders.164 With this
focus on building up citizens‘ capacity, it augments official policies
for democracy-building, and comports with a major focus of
international NGO development practice.165
161. See, e.g., Timothy Hildebrandt, The Political Economy of Social Organization
Registration in China, 208 CHINA Q. 970 (2011) (presenting in-depth field research of
Chinese NGOs in issue areas of environmental protection, HIV/AIDS prevention, and gay
and lesbian rights).
162. SHINING STONE COMMUNITY ACTION CENTER, http://www.communityaction.org.cn/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
163. Press Release, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, Civil Society with Chinese
Characteristics: A talk by Song Quinghua (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.international.
ucla.edu/china/events/showevent.asp?eventid=7653&eventdate=11/23/2009.
164. Id.
165. Considerable attention is paid in international-development circles to ―downward
development,‖ the accountability of the international NGOs to the desires of the population
they aim to aid. The U.S. analog would be conversations among charitable foundations as to
their relationship to community beneficiaries of their grant-making and program support.
Such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for
Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217 (1999)
(examining the role of policymakers, intermediaries, and communities seeking a say in their
redevelopment, and concluding that technical assistance providers contribute to the
disempowerment accompanying the implementation of policy agendas). Rather than address
what might be viewed as the ‗supply side‘ of international NGOs‘ contribution to China‘s
third sector, in this paper my concern for accountability addresses the demand side, the quest
by Chinese citizens for accountability within their society. For a sampling of rich case
studies of American instances of urban communities wresting such accountability in modern
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Beginning in 2003, the founders designed and conducted
multiple training workshops on their participation-based approach to
community governance and development in many cities across
China, including Beijing, Wuhan, Nanjing, Qingdao, Ningbo and
Shanghai, earning favorable notice from government agencies. In
2003 and 2004, the Ministry of Civil Affairs invited founder Song
twice as a key lecturer at its ―China Urban Community Participation‖
training program, co-sponsored with the U.S.-based National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs.166 In 2005, Ms. Song
initiated a new bottom-up model of community development in
Haishu district, Ningbo city, helping local government agencies to
modify their traditional top-down model to a new bottom up,
participation-based approach to community development.167 In 2006,
Shining Stone launched the Program for Leadership Training and
Cooperation for Sustainable Community Development in China to
train mayors, other local leaders, and community residents to work
together to protect public health and the environment.168
V. NEGOTIATING ACCOUNTABILITY
VARIANTS OF MOBILIZATION

OR

BUILDING CIVIL SOCIETY:

The prospects for a community-accountable development
movement in China are difficult to discern, but no doubt brewing.
Nonetheless, there is little imminent prospect for an American-style,
CBA strategy to be replicated in China anytime soon due to the
fundamentally different loci of city power in China‘s contemporary
urban redevelopment scene.
The CBA strand of the accountable-development movement in
the United States is an important advance in modifying the direction
of redevelopment in American cities. Yet it is a creature of shifting
economic and political fortunes of U.S. cities and thus the
environment in which U.S. ‗growth coalitions‘ operate.
CBA practices have burst on the scene in the United States
following the profound decentralization of urban redevelopment
urban redevelopment context, see PENDA D. HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS,
COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 120–139 (2001), available at
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/hair.pdf; PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR,
STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994).
166. Press Release, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, supra note 163.
167. Id.
168. The author met with trainees, and received Shining Stone training materials, while
guest lecturing in Lanzhou, Gansu Province, in June 2011.
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since the 1970s, whereas China‘s redevelopment remains firmly in
the hands of local organs of the socialist state, vigorously committed
to remaking the urban environs as emblems of China‘s national
wealth and power. American urban renewal was similarly run by
local powerbrokers, enabled by the concentration of power in
government bureaucracies, and enabled the spending of development
resources in largely unaccountable ways. 169 But since the 1970s,
urban development economics have become decentralized with the
loss of federal funding and public resources that stoked the upward
class transformation and economic conversion of cities. American
cities have become dependent on private capital and, facing
competition with other localities for private resources, their leverage
over developers has diminished. As a result, cities‘ capacity to attend
to communities‘ economic and social welfare has declined as well,
shifting the burden to communities themselves to step up as players
in, rather than passive recipients of, the bargaining between
developers and the city.
However, there is the very real prospect that China‘s burgeoning
citizen activism is remaking societal norms as to the distribution of
burdens and benefits of modernization‘s urban redevelopment.
Disparate citizen practices of resistance and extra-legal activism may
perhaps coalesce as ―norm entrepreneurship‖ working at all levels,
international, transnational, national, and local. 170 The audacious
speed and scale of China‘s reinvention of its urban fabric carries with
it changes in its social and political landscape, some under-studied,
some perhaps unseen.171
CONCLUSION
Urban housing demolition reveals both the difficulty and the
possibility of progress toward rule of law in China. The pressure from
the populace is so great because undercompensated housing
demolition cuts across social and economic status in China‘s cities.
Aided by the media and netizens, violations of housing rights fuel
169. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1999, 2019–20 (2007).
170. Judith Resnik, Law‟s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism‟s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1670 (2006) (noting the necessity
of working at multiple sites—international, transnational, national, local–as a ―norm
entrepreneur‖).
171. The spread and acceptance of accountable development, instantiated through CBAs
in the United States, has taken place within a decade—all without any new statutes,
regulatory requirements, or governmental policy pronouncements.
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widespread resentment and threaten to undermine the legitimacy of
the central government‘s expressed commitments to legal rights and
credible institutions. Plainly, urban development under the rule of
law is still a fragmentary dream. The possibility of progress toward
the rule of law on a scale sufficient to constrain local-government
actors appears to lie in the persistence of China‘s citizens to employ a
range of extra-legal modes of resistance, including protests, petitions,
and violent confrontations. While this resistance may provide
incentive to the Chinese central government to ―make the revolution
before the people do,‖ it is not at all certain that the resolution will be
―to get the struggles off the streets and into the courts.‖172 It is too
early to tell whether China‘s nascent grassroots NGO sector will
produce a form of community-accountable development organization
with Chinese characteristics.

172. Yongshun Cai, supra note 20, at 194.

